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MORAL ICONS: A COMMENT ON STEVEN ·
LUBET'S RECONSTRUCTING

ATTICUS FINCH
William H. Simon*
Atticus Finch's conduct would have been justified by the bar's
conventional norms even if he had known Tom Robinson to be
guilty. That fact, however, is not the source of the admiration for
him that To Kill a Mockingbird has induced in so many readers.
That admiration depends on the clear premise of the novel that
Finch plausibly believes that Tom Robinson is innocent. Thus, the
bar's invocation of Finch as a sympathetic illustration of its norms is
misleading. The ethics of the novel are quite different from those of
the bar.
Steven Lubet does a good job of showing that the novel's ethics
are somewhat out of step with contemporary liberal sentiment. In
order to be confident of Robinson's innocence, we have to take for
granted aspects of Harper Lee's portrayal of his accusers that today
smack of gender and class bias. I differ somewhat with Lubet over
the significance of this failing for ethical discussion in two respects.
First, if we treat the novel as a professional responsibility hypo
thetical, then I think Finch's conduct is ethically plausible - not
just in terms of the bar's norms, but in terms of the more ambitious
conceptions of justice that the novel and Lubet invoke - as long as
he had any doubts about Robinson's guilt. Unless Finch knew for
certain that Mayella Ewell was testifying truthfully, he would have
viewed his cross-examination as an effort to test her credibility (or
if he was certain she was lying, to expose her). Yes, he did trauma
tize and humiliate her. This is a major injury, and in many situa
tions it might be unconscionable to inflict it. But in 1930s Alabama,
an accusation of rape by a white woman against a black man was
tantamount to a demand for the man's death. Even a truthful rape
victim should understand that the stakes in this situation warrant
efforts that may be painful to her to assure the soundness of the
verdict.
Second, if we treat the novel as a depiction of an exemplary
moral figure, my strongest objection is more general than the one
Lubet raises. Lubet doesn't like it that Lee reduces her villains to
"stereotypes." On the other hand, his principal disappointment is
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that she fails to make Finch in�o a fully consistent stereotype
("icon") of virtue. Up until the ending of the novel, Lee clearly
tries to do this, and her effort no longer succeeds for the reasons
Lubet mentions. But there is a serious question as to whether icons
of virtue are what we should look for in novels. Uncomplicated
goodness is what romantic and escapist fiction offer us. More ambi
tious novels give us more complex, less perfect role models.
Romantic fiction can inspire us, but it can also make us smug and
unreflective. Ambitious fiction is less intoxicating in its inspiration,
but it urges us to confront a broader range of experience.
·

There is one point in To Kill a Mockingbird where the novel
starts to cross the boundary between romantic and ambitious fic
tion. This is at the very end, which is curiously ignored by those
who invoke the book on behalf of conventional professional norms.
The ending is the only point at which Atticus is portrayed as less
than perfect. He loses an argument with the sheriff, and he collabo
rates on a project which today could only be called "obstruction of
justice." He agrees with the sheriff to encourage the children to lie
about Bob Ewell's death to make it appear an accident, when in
fact, they think Finch's son has killed him The killing was clear
self-defense, but the sheriff's point is that the local system of justice
has not proven itself so reliable that it can be trusted to vindicate
him Here is a portrayal of virtue that is intentionally complex (un
like the trial, where the complexity Lubet explicates is uninten
tional). Our role model was initially wrong (for resisting the
sheriff's plan), even now is not certain he's doing the right thing,
and is doing something that, though it seems likely to be the right
thing, involves violation of the law. This tentative and compro
mised kind of virtue seems more interesting, and the portrayal of it
more valuable, than the iconic virtue Finch has heretofore shown
because it seems the only kind possible in many of the most morally
compelling situations lawyers face in life.
.
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